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•FIRST DAY SECTION ONE 
I ,• 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - July 27, 1982 
1. On May 6, 1981, Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment 
against Defendant for $12,000 in the Circuit Court of the City 
f Lynchburg in which he alleged (1) that he was injured on April 
1, 1981 when he tripped over a shovel which X had negligently left 
;on the front walkway of X's Lynchburg home (Allegation No. 1); 
~(2) that X~~as an employee of Defendant (Allegation No. 2); and 
~(3) that Plaintiff suffered damage as the result of his injury 
the amount of $12,000 (Allegation No. 3) .. 
(a) What pleading should counsel for Defendant file and with-
what time? 
(b) Assume that Defendant filed grounds of defense in which 
rhe denied Allegations Nos. 1 and 3 of the motion for judgment and 
that at the trial Plaintiff introduced some evidence in support 
~f each of the allegations of the motion for judgment, ~fter which 
~Plaintiff rested his case. What should counsel for Defendant then 
do? 
. (c) Assume that Defendant filed grounds of defense in which 
he denied Allegations Nos. 1 and 3 of the motion for judgment, 
that at the trial Plaintiff introduced some evidence in support 
fof Allegations Nos. 1 and 2 of the motion for judgment after which 
he rested his case and that Defendant's counsel immediately rested 
Defendant's case without putting on any evidence. Assume further 
that the Judge, at the request of Defendant's counsel, indicated 
~hat he was going to instruct the jury that Plaintiff had failed 
'to prove any damage. What should counsel for the Plaintiff then 
.do? 
* ";"; * * * 
2. Al Aardvark, a resident of Richmond, Virginia, and Ben 
Bluebird and Carl Cardinal, residents of Baltimore, Maryland, were 
classmates at the University of Virginia, graduating in 1972. Dur-
ing their undergraduate years, the three founded and ran a success-
ful food concession business. Following graduation, they decided 
.to become partners in a small restautant in Richmond. Bluebird 
snd Cardinal contributed capital to the partnership, and Aardvark 
~contributed a smaller amount of capital and managed the restaurant. 
In June 1982, the three decided to take their families to 
Kings Dominion. While there, they got into an argument over whether 
the recent rules changes would help or hinder the University of 
Virginia's chances of winning the Atlantic Coast Conference basket-
ball championship in the upcoming 1982-83 season. One thing led 
to another, and a fist fight ensued during which Aardvark suffered 
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serious facial injuries which eventually required complex and expen-
sive reconstructive plastic surgery. Bluebird and Cardinal suffered 
lesser injuries. 
Aardvark subsequently filed suit againsi Bluebird and Cardin-
al in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
alleging battery and seeking to recover $20,000 in damages. Blue-
bird denied Aardvark's allegations and filed a two count counter-
claim, alleging in Count I that Aardvark was to blame for the fight 
And was accordingly liable for Bluebird's injuries. In Count II 
,of the counterclaim, Bluebird alleged that Aardvark and Cardinal 
had breached the restaurant partnership agreement by diverting 
.~ disproportionate share of the profits from the restaurant to 
~themselves, and demanded an a~counting and damages in an amount 
exceeding $10,000. Bluebird also filed a three count crossclaim 
against Cardinal, alleging in Count I that Cardinal was responsible 
for the fight and accordingly was liable for Bluebird's injuries . 
. Jn Count II of the crossclaim, Bluebird asserted the same claim for 
an accounting of the partnership profits which he had alleged in 
Count II of his counterclaim. In Count III of the crossclaim, Blue-
bird alleged that Cardinal had breached an agreement to repay a 
loan of $11,000 which Bluebird had made to him two years ago for 
the purpose of buying a car. 
Aardvark filed a motion to dismiss Bluebird's counterclaim 
and Cardinal filed a motion to dismiss Bluebird's crossclaim. How 
should the Court rule on the motions? 
3. Paul Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit 
of the City of Roanoke, Virginia against Dan Defendant in 
which he alleged that he was injured when an automobile negligently 
operated by Defendant struck Plaintiff as he was crossing the 
street at an intersection in Roanoke, Virginia. Defendant's lawyer 
filed grounds of defense denying that Defendant was guilty of any 
negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident. 
At the trial of the case, Plaintiff testified that before-
he started to cross the street~ he looked both ways, saw no ap~ 
proaching automobiles, started to cross and when he was about in 
the middle, Defendant's vehicle "appeared out of nowhere traveling 
at a high speed" and struck and injured him. 
After Plaintiff rested his case, Defendant testified that 
he approached the intersection at about 20 MPH and when he was 
"almost there" Plaintiff suddenly ran out in front of him. Lily 
Lookout, a witness for the defendant, testified that she observed 
the accident from her window which overlooked the intersection 
and that the accident happened just as Defendant had described. 
At the conclusion of the evidence Defendant asked for an 
instruction that if the jury believed from a preponderance of the 
evidence that Plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately 
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contributed to cause the accident, the jury should find for the 
defendant. 
Does Plaintiff have any valid ground~ upon which to object 
to that instruction? If so, what are the grounds and what, if any-
thing, could Defendant do to avoid the consequences of a ruling 
.in Plaintiff's favor? If Plaintiff has no valid grounds for such 
an objection, explain why he does not. 
* * * * * 
4. Fairfax County police, acting on a tip, apprehended John 
.Smith and Joe White as they entered the Airtight Savings & Loan 
Association in Fairfax County. When apprehended, Smith had a burlap 
sack over his right arm and hand, concealing a gun, which he held 
in that hand. Smith and White were charged with a conspiracy to 
commit robbery and murder. 
At the arraignment the next day, it was determined that Smith 
was indigent and the Court thereupon appointed counsel for him. 
The defendant was then returned to the Fairfax County jail. Later 
that same day, Detective Bill Jones initiated an interview with 
Smith at the jail. Following proper Miranda warnings, Smith gave 
~ statement to Jones in which he outlined what he and White had 
·planned to do: 
"Our intention was first to shoot and kill the 
guard normally stationed within the bank, and 
then to make off with the money." 
Smith-in-et hi·s -court-·appointed- counsel - fur the ·first time 
the next day and informed him of the statement he had given Jones. 
Smith's attorney thereupon filed a motion to suppress the statement 
on the ground that Smith had not been allowed sufficient time to 
.~onfer with his court-appointed counsel before the police initiated 
.a custodial interview with him. At the suppression hearing, Jones 
testified that, at the time he interviewed Smith at the jail, he 
did not know whether Smith had been arraigned, or whether counsel 
had been appointed. He testified that he made no attempt to ascer-
tain if counsel had been, in fact, appointed, and, of course, did 
not try to notify counsel of the interview. He stated that Smith 
willingly gave the statement, without ever asking to see counsel 
at any time during the course of the interview. The court overruled 
·the motion to suppress. 
At Smith's trial, over the objection of defense counsel, 
the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce the statement which 
Smith had given Jones. In addition, also over the objection of 
defense counsel, the Commonwealth was permitted to show that Smith 
.and White had robbed other Fairfax County banking institutions 
·twice within a short period preceding the robbery for which he 
was being tried. Evidence was introduced that, on both occasions, 
one of the two had entered the bank with a burlap bag concealing 
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a gun, and had shot a bank guard stationed inside the bank. Smith 
convicted of the offenses with which he was charged. 
. On app~al to the Virginia Supreme Court, Smith contends (a) 
'·that it was error not to suppress the statement he had given to 
Detective Jones on the day of his arraignment; and (b) that it 
error to admit evidence of the prior robberies. 
How should the Court rule on these assignments of error? 
* * * * * ' (·. 
5. Farmer Brown has decided to subdivide 50 acres in the 
,~iddle of his farm in Sampson County, Virginia~ which has no zoning 
.. laws, into 50 similar residential lots. He. contacts his lawyer, 
Bailey F. Lee, and asks him to take the. nec,essary actions to make 
his subdivison, which he calls Brown Acres, a reality. 
Lee immediately has a plat of Brown Acres preparE;!d and. record-
which shows the 50 lots, all bordering on a 20-fopt' pl:""ivate 
road called Brown Lane which leads from U • S ... Route ~!~f~n:[ougli the 
. subdivision to Brown's house. No notations or othe:r;!l:'.'oacjwa s,;appear 
the plat. ..,,, 
Lee also prepares sample deeds to be used witq;.,> e•c9nveyance 
of each subdivison lot. Each of these deeds includes"'.'7'aC: righf' of 
ingress and egress to Route 11 over Brown Lane (which'was still 
owned by Farmer Brown) and also includes certain restrictions. 
These restrictions, which can be waived only with the consent of 
60 percent of the lot owners in the subdivision, state in part 
that the lots in the subdivision are to be used for residential 
use only. 
Once the plat of the subdivision is of record, Farmer Brown 
begins a vigorous campaign to advertise and sell his lots. This 
includes the erection of a sign at the entrance to Brown Acres 
which touts the fact that this is a restricted subdivision with 
lots being used for residential purposes only. 
, After .Farmer Brown sold 10 of the subdivided lots, using 
the form of deed prepared by Lee, Mr. Cavie Emptor, a retired bar 
exmainer and short-order cook, drives by Brown Acres, sees the 
sign, thoroughly reviews one of Lee's sample deeds, and decides 
to buy a lot in the middle of the subdivision. Unfortunately, Lee's 
office is not open wh~n the sale is to close, so Farmer Brown is 
required to call on Sam Shiftless, his brother-in-law, who special-
izes in admiralty law in Craig County, to draft the actual deed 
to Emptor's lot. The general warranty deed which Shiftless prepares 
does not include any restrictions on the property or any language 
concerning the right to use Brown Lane. · 
In the next few months, Brown sells all of the rest of the 
lots in Br.own Acres, each lot being conveyed by one of Lee's stan-
dard deeds to the new property owner. 
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Mr. Emptor, happy with his lot but bored by ~~tirement, de-
cides to open a.Moped repair shop on his lot. Emptot is successful 
with his shop and soon Brown Lane is crowded with little old ladies 
on Mopeds going to and from Emptor's garage. 
Incensed by Emptor's operation of a business on his lot and 
the Moped traffic~ the other property owners in Brown Acres get 
together and employ you to advise them with respect to the follow-
ing questions: 
(a) Can Emptor be enjoined from operating a business on his 
even though his deed contained no restrictions as to the lot's 
use? 
(b) Can Emptor and his customers be,enjoined from using Brown 
Lane since his deed from Farmer Brown contained no language grant-
a right-of-way over the road? 
What answers and supporting reasons therefor would you give 
clients to each of these questions? 
* * * * * 
6. Tess Tracy retained the services of Mitchell Marvinson, 
Esq., to represent her in obtaining a divorce from her husband,. 
Richard. On June 2, 1982, Marvinson filed a sworn bill of complaint 
in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County alleging, among other perti-
nent facts, that the parties were married in the City of Roanoke 
on June 15, 1979; that they thereafter resided in the County of 
Roanoke until their separation on May 15, 1981; that they have 
not cohabited as husband and wife for at least one year prior to 
the date of filing; that both parties still reside in Roanoke Coun-
ty; that there are no children born of the marriage; and that no 
spousal support or separation of property is sought by the complain-
ant. 
Service or process was properly obtained on Richard Tracy 
in person on June 4, 1982, and on July 1, 1982, no answer or appear-
ance having been filed or made by the respondent, Marvinson, with-
out further notice to the respondent, took the sworn depositions 
of the complainant and her good friend, Sparkle Plenty, both of 
whom affirmed in all respects the allegations contained in the 
bill of complaint. Thereafter, on July 2, 1982, Marvinson filed 
the depositions with the court and served notice to Richard Tracy 
by mail that on July 16, 1982, at 8:30 a.m., in the chambers of 
Judge Bullington in the Roanoke County Courthouse, Marvinson would 
present for entry a final decree of divorce, a copy of which was 
attached to the notice. 
On July 16, 1982, at the appointed time and place, Sandra 
Dai, Esq., appeared on behalf of Richard Tracy and objected to 
entry of the proposed final decree. 
On what grounds should Sandra base her objections? 
* *. * * * 
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7. Mr. Smith, a resident of Smithfield, Virginia, died on 
.December 1, 1981. He was survived by four childre~~ John, Bob, 
Sue and Betty. Following Mr. Smith's death, his safe deposit box 
at the Smithfield Bank located in his home town was opened and 
inventoried. It contained three sealed envelop~s and one savings 
account passbook evidencing an account withlthe Smithfield Bank 
.. to which was attached a photocopy of the bank's signature card. 
One envelope was addressed to Bob, one to Sue, and one to 
;Betty. Each envelope contained a United States Government Bond 
~ayable to Bearer. Bob's envelope contained a Bond in the principal 
~amount of $150,000, Sue's $90,000, and Betty's $75,000. Also en-
;closed in ~~ch envelope was a letter from'Mr .. Smith to the appro-
'priate child, dated November 1, 1981, stating: "The enclosed Bond 
·of $ is a gift for Christmas." "~"<' · 
Smith's savings account was in the amotint of $50,000. It 
had been established by Mr. Smith on January.1, 1981, in the names 
of "Mr. Smith and John Smith, joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship." The copy of the signature card required both, ,Mr·: Smith and 
John to sign in two places, once to establish their{s.igriatures 
for account purposes and once beside a statement reading:)}'JOINT 
'ACCOUNT WITH SURVIVORSHIP." ' ·•··.·· "',.·' . 
'..i,') 
Mr. Smith's will, dated September 1, 1981, was'probafed on 
··December 10, 1981, and Last National Bank of Smithfield,< Virginia, 
~uly qualified as Executor. Under the provisions of the will, John 
was disinherited. There was a specific provision stating that John 
was to receive nothing from the estate and also stating that the 
· $50,000 joint account in the name of Mr. Smith and John Smith was 
not to pass to John but was to be divided equally among Bob, Sue 
and Betty. The residue of Mr. Smith's estate was also to be divided 
in equal shares among those three children. 
Due to questions raised by various beneficiaries, the Last 
National Bank has petitioned the court for advice~ You have been 
appointed Commissioner in Chancery to hear the matter. At your 
·only hearing on the matter, Bob, Sue and Betty each testified that 
Mr. Smith had informed them that he was making gifts to them of 
certain notes. Sue testified that .she served as Mr. Smith's secre-
tary for a salary of $700 per month. She said she had been appoint-
ed a deputy to enter Mr. Smith's safe deposit box. At Mr. Smith's 
request, she entered that box on November 1, 1981, and carried 
all of the subject Bonds to Mr. Smith's office. Mr. Smith then 
dictated the letters later found in the envelopes and Sue said 
she typed those for him. She addressed the envelopes and gave them 
to Mr. Smith. He put the letters and Bonds in the envelopes and 
sealed them. It was then late in the day and Mr. Smith instructed 
her to return them to the safe deposit box, which she did. She 
said he mentioned the gifts to her again but never instructed her 
to mail or deliver the envelopes to herself, Bob and Betty. 
John testified concerning the joint account. He stated that 
executed the signature card at his father's request and 
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acknowledged that all of the money pl~ced in the account had belong-
ed to Mr. Smith. None of the other children had any knowledge of 
the account, although Sue had seen the passbook in the safe deposit 
No other testimony was received concerning the joint account. 
The following questions have been presented to you for deci-
at this time:· 
{a) Are the Bonds the property of Bob, Sue and Betty or are 
~hey assets of Mr. Smith's residuary estate, to be divided equally 
among those three children? 
{b) Sh9uld the savings account be divided equally among Bob, 
and Betty as specified in Mr. Smith:s will? 
How would you rule on each of these questions? 
* * * * * 
8. The First Colonial Bank of Timberville, Virginia, retained 
attorney Percy Livingston to defend the bank in an action brought 
,in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia, Harrisonburg Division, for alleged violations of the 
Federal Truth in Lending Act. 
For his services, Livingston was to be paid $85 per hour 
out-of-pocket expenses, including mileage at 25 cents per 
for the use of his own car. 
Timberville lies 96 miles southwest of Harrisonburg and on 
morning set for trial, Livingston left his home at 6:45 a.m. 
in order to allow himself more than ample time to reach Harrison-
burg by 9:30 a.m., the time set for the trial. 
At approximately 8:15 a.m., Livingston fell asleep at the 
and slammed into the rear of a school bus; causing personal 
to several children passengers. 
An action for personal injuries to one of the children was 
filed in the Circuit Court of Rockingham County against First Colo-
nial Bank and Livingston. At trial before a jury, upon the close 
of the plaintiff's evidence, counsel for First Colonial Bank moved 
the court to strike the plaintiff's evidence and enter summary 
~judgment for the bank on the grounds that the bank was not legally 
responsible for any negligence of Livingston in the operation of 
his car which struck the school bus. 
How should the court rule and why? 
* * * * * 
9. Ring obtained a judgment against Deadbeat in the General 
, District Court of York County, Virginia, in May of 1982, for 
~2,000. Shortly after judgment was rendered, the Gefieral District 
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Court issued a writ of fieri facias and delivered it to the Sheriff 
of York County. The only property of Deadbeat in York County was 
a house and lot. Ring requested the Sheriff to levy upon this prop-
erty and have it sold before the return day of the writ. 
Three day: after delivering the writ to the Sheriff of York 
County, Ring lc.rned that Deadbeat owned a.cabin cruiser and color 
television, which he kept at the home of his son-in-law in James 
~ity County. When Ring learned of the personal property belonging 
to Deadbeat in James City County, he immediately instructed the 
~heriff of Y6rk County to also lev~ upon th~ cruiser and television. 
What success should Ring have: 
(a) In having the Sheriff levy upon Deadbeat's house and 
in York County? 
(b) In subjecting the cabin cruiser and television to the 
of the writ of fieri facias? 
* * * * * 
10. In 1968, Jack Sprat gave to his wife, Ine:~LSp.raEr
1
YOo, 
shares of the common stock of Sprat, Inc., a btisinessT, corporation 
organized by Jack Sprat. In April 1980, unhappy differ'ences· cirose 
petween Jack and Inez which resulted in her moving fr6m the family 
ome. In May 1980, Inez commenced a divorce suit against her hus-
and in the Circuit Court of Mecklenburg County, Virginia, charging 
im with adultery. Jack promptly tried to effect a reconciliation 
ith his wife, stoutly denying that he was guilty of adultery. 
ailing in his attempt for a reconciliation, he filed an answer 
enying the charges of adultery and he also filed a cross bill 
harging his wife with desertion. Before the date set for a hearing 
re tenus, the parties and their attorneys met in an effort to 
esolve the differences between the parties. As a result of this 
eeting, a written contract was entered into between the parties 
eciting that in consideration of the wife's agreement to assign 
nd deliver to her husband the 100 shares of stock in Sprat, Inc., 
ack Sprat agreed to dismiss 'his cross· bill seeking a divorce on 
he ground of desertion. The day after the agreement was entered 
nto by the parties, an order was entered dismissing Jack Sprat's 
ross bill pursuant to a written motion filed in the cause by Jack 
prat. Although the wife's bill of complaint was not dismissed 
pd the suit remained on the docket, Inez Sprat, because of her 
ealth, went to Florida one month after the cross bill was dis-
~ssed. After remaining in Florida for the time required to give 
Florida court jurisdiction, she obtained a divorce from her hus-
and on the ground of incompatibility. Shortly after obtaining 
.he Florida divorce, Inez Sprat returned to Mecklenburg County 
~visit her mother and while she was in that County, Jack·Sprat 
iled a suit in equity against her for the purpose of requiring 
er to transfer and assign and deliver to him the 100 shares of 
tock in Sprat, Inc. A copy of the written contract was filed with 
he bill of complaint. Inez Sprat filed a demurrer to the bill 
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of complaint assigning as a ground of demurrer that the contract 
was not supported by a valuable consideration and was, therefore, 
unenforceable. j 
How should the Court rule on the demurrer? 
* * '" * * 
